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INTRODUCTION 
Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine1 in the Tax Reform Act of 
19862, an issue has been festering concerning estate and gift tax valuations of closely 
held stock.3  The Treasury Regulations (“Regulations”) require that assets be valued 
at fair market value determined by the price that a hypothetical buyer and seller 
would agree upon as of the date of death (or date of the gift)4.  The issue addressed 
in this article is whether the taxpayer is allowed to discount that fair market value by 
some or the entire amount of the capital gains tax that would theoretically be payable 
upon liquidation or distribution of the business’s appreciated assets (often referred to 
as “built-in gains”). 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or “Service”) and the Tax Court 
initially determined that such a discount was not permitted because the amount of 
the tax was too speculative.5 However, after contrary holdings by the Second, Fifth, 
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1 The General Utilities doctrine, which allowed a corporation to liquidate its assets and pass the 
proceeds to its shareholders without the corporation being taxed on the gains, originated from General 
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).  See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
3 Estate and gift taxes are based on cumulative lifetime transfers and property owned (as defined by 
the Internal Revenue Code) at the date of death.  Graduated rates are applied based on the total 
amount of estate property and lifetime transfers less exempt transfers and amounts.  See I.R.C. §§ 
2001, 2502 (2006). 
4 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (estate tax valuation); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as 
amended in 1992) (gift tax valuation). 
5 See, e.g., Estate of Luton v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994); Estate of Bennett v. Comm’r, 65 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79 
T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piper v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Cruikshank v. Comm’r, 9 
T.C. 162 (1947).  In a Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service advised that while the General 
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and Sixth Circuits, a discount is now permissible even absent a showing that 
liquidation is likely.6  The focus of the courts has largely shifted to the amount of the 
discount.  The Second and Sixth Circuits have not definitively established whether a 
full discount is allowable, but have hinted that something less than the full amount of 
the tax is more appropriate.7  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, however, have now 
held that a full discount is proper.8  In June 2008, the Commissioner of the IRS 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Commissioner v. Estate of Jelke.9  The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 6, 
2008.10 
This article will examine the most important decisions leading up to Jelke, 
provide a thorough examination of the Jelke appellate court decision, and end with an 
analysis of what the most appropriate valuation method should be.  Many hoped that 
the Supreme Court would hear the Jelke case and resolve the issue so that valuations 
could be conducted on a more consistent basis across the country.11  That hope, 
however, was not realized. 
I.  THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
This discussion begins with an examination of the Internal Revenue Code 
(the “Code”).  Under § 2031 of the Code, the federal estate tax encompasses all 
property of a decedent as valued at time of death, valued as of the time of death.12  
                                                                                                                                     
Utilities doctrine was one reason for disallowing the tax discount, the primary reason was the 
“speculative nature of the liquidation itself.”  The abrogation of General Utilities by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 thus had no affect on the disallowance of the discount.  No liquidation was contemplated 
under the facts of the Memorandum, so no discount was allowed.  I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-50-001 
(Aug. 20, 1991). 
6 See discussion infra Part II.B-C, E regarding the Eisenberg, Welch, and Dunn cases. 
7 See discussion infra Part II.B-C regarding the Eisenberg and Welch cases. 
8 See discussion infra Part II.E and Part III regarding the Dunn and Jelke cases. 
9 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 2008 WL 2472932 (June 19, 2008) (No. 
07-1582). 
10 Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008). 
11 Issues regarding discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability are often involved in cases 
concerning discounts for potential capital gains tax liability, but those discounts are beyond the scope 
of this article. 
12 Section 2031 provides:  “The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by 
including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property, real 
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.”  I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2006). 
2009] OF ROCKS AND HARD PLACES 177
 
That description is somewhat refined by § 2033 of the Code, which provides that the 
gross estate includes the decedent’s property owned at death, “to the extent of the 
interest therein.”13  This generally includes the decedent’s probate assets.14 
The Code provisions are clarified in the Regulations—particularly in sections 
20.2031-2 and 20.2031-3.  Section 20.2031-3 of the Regulations specifies that the fair 
market value of a decedent’s interest in a business is the “net” amount that a willing 
purchaser and a willing seller would agree upon, presuming that the transaction was 
voluntary and informed.15  The value is to be based upon, among other things, an 
appraisal of the business’s assets, earning capacity, and “other factors” listed in 
section 20.2031-2(f) of the Regulations.16  These other factors include goodwill, 
economic outlook, industry position, degree of control, and values of similar 
businesses listed on an exchange.17  Section 20.2031-2 of the Regulations generally 
discusses the valuation of stocks and bonds.18  Section 20.2031-2(f) specifically 
discusses the valuation of stock where comparable prices are not available.  This 
would typically be a situation involving closely held business interests.  In such cases, 
consideration includes “net worth, prospective earning power and dividend paying 
capacity, and other relevant factors.”19  In addition to these factors, non-operating 
assets merit consideration in the valuation determination to the extent not otherwise 
considered.20   
Revenue Ruling 59-60 is of additional significance to the statutory and 
regulatory posture of the capital gains tax deduction analysis.21  The Ruling, which 
was originally promulgated in January, 1959, provides guidance in the valuation of 
                                                 
13 I.R.C. § 2033 (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of 
the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”). 
14 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1965). 
15 Id. § 20.2031-3 (as amended in 1992). 
16 Id. § 20.2031-3(a)-(c).   
17 Id. § 20.2031-2(f)(2).  The weight to be accorded these factors is based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.  Id. 
18 Id. § 20.2031-2.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (amplified in Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, Rev. Rul. 80-214, 
1980-2 C.B. 171, and Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170) (modified in Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 
370). 
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stock of closely held businesses for estate and gift tax purposes.22  The Ruling 
recognizes that valuation of such interests is not exact but rather calls on judgment, 
common sense, and reasonableness.  The Ruling also identifies and discusses eight 
factors to be considered.23  In particular, in discussing book value and financial 
condition, the Ruling says that non-operating assets, including securities and real 
estate investments, should be included.24  Investment assets are to be considered at 
market, rather than book, value.25 
The Ruling also discusses the weight to be accorded the various factors.  In 
operating businesses, earning capacity should take precedence.26  For investment 
companies, asset value is primary.27  In fact, the Ruling states that net asset value 
should be accorded greater weight in valuing real estate or investment companies 
than earnings or dividend-paying capacity.28 
II.  THE CASE LAW BACKGROUND 
The discussion of whether and how much to deduct from the value of a 
closely held business for the amount attributable to the contingent tax on capital 
gains residing in such business dates back to the 1935 case General Utilities & 
                                                 
22 Id. § 1.  A closely held business is one in which there are a relatively small number of owners and no 
ready market for the sale of an ownership interest.  Id. at § 2.03. 
23 The factors, not exclusive of others, are considered “fundamental” and are as follows: “the nature 
of the business and the history of the enterprise since its inception,” “the economic outlook in general 
and the condition and outlook of the specific industry in particular,” “the book value of the stock and 
the financial condition of the business,” “the earning capacity of the company,” “the dividend paying 
capacity,” “whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value,” “sales of the stock 
and the size of the block of stock to be valued,” and “the market price of stocks of corporations 
engaged in the same or a similar line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open 
market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter.”  Id. § 4.01(a)-(h). 
24 Id. § 4.02(c). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. § 5(a). 
27 Id.  
28 “For companies of this type, the appraiser should determine the fair market values of the assets of 
the company.  Operating expenses of such a company and the cost of liquidating it, if any, merit 
consideration when appraising the relative values of the stock and the underlying assets . . . adjusted 
net worth should be accorded greater weight in valuing the stock of a closely held investment or real 
estate holding company, whether or not family owned, than any other customary yardsticks of 
appraisal, such as earnings or dividend paying capacity.”  Id. § 5(b) (emphasis added).  The taxes 
payable on liquidation could be considered part of the cost of liquidation. 
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Operating Co. v. Helvering.29  In General Utilities, the United States Supreme Court held 
that there was no entity level tax on a distribution of appreciated property to 
shareholders, creating the so-called “General Utilities doctrine.”30  The doctrine was 
codified in I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 336 and 337.31  In 1986, as part of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, Congress eliminated the General Utilities doctrine from the Code.32  Section 
336 now states that a corporation should treat a liquidating distribution of property 
to shareholders as a sale.33  Section 311(b) now also provides that if a company 
distributes property which has a fair market value in excess of the company’s basis in 
that property, the company must treat the transaction as a sale even if it is not in 
complete liquidation.34  The recipient of such a distribution in complete liquidation is 
treated as having received payment in full in exchange for their stock (i.e., capital 
gain taxation).35  The 1986 change to §§ 311 and 336 created the issue of whether the 
potential corporate level capital gains tax should be deducted in computing the value 
of the closely held business for estate and gift tax purposes and, if so, the proper 
amount of that deduction.  Several cases preceding Jelke considered the issue, but the 
holdings of those cases were inconsistent and resulted in circuit splits.  This 
discussion now turns to the most prominent cases preceding the Jelke decision. 
                                                 
29 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
30 Id. at 206. 
31 Section 311(a) formerly provided that “no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the 
distribution, with respect to its stock, of 1) its stock (or rights to acquire its stock), or 2) property.”  
I.R.C. § 311(a) (1954) (amended 1986).  Section 336 formerly provided that “no gain or loss shall be 
recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation.”  Id. § 
336.  Section 337 formerly provided that if a corporation distributed all its assets in complete 
liquidation within twelve months of adoption of a plan of liquidation, no gain or loss would be 
recognized by the corporation.  Id. § 337. 
32 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
33 I.R.C. § 336(a) now provides that “gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corporation on 
the distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such property were sold to the distributee at 
fair market value.”  I.R.C. § 336(a) (2006).  Section 337 now provides for non-recognition of gain or 
loss on distributions by an 80% owned subsidiary to its parent in complete liquidation.  Id. § 337(a). 
34 Id. § 311(b)(1).  Section 311(a) now states that no gain or loss is recognized to a corporation on a 
distribution not in complete liquidation of its stock or property except as provided in subsection (b).  
Id. § 311(a) (emphasis added). 
35 Id. § 331(a).  Generally, if a distribution of property is not in complete liquidation, a shareholder will 
have dividend income to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and profits, no income (to 
the extent of their basis in the stock), and then capital gain income for any remaining amount of the 
distribution.  Id. § 301(a)-(c). 
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A.  Davis v. Commissioner 
The decedent in Davis v. Commissioner died as the beneficiary of a trust that 
owned all the stock of a closely held corporation.36  That corporation held various 
assets, including 1.328% of the outstanding common stock of Winn-Dixie Stores, 
Inc. 37  The Winn-Dixie stock alone was valued at $70 million.38  Prior to the 
decedent’s death, he gifted approximately 25% of the holding company’s stock to 
each of his two sons.39  These gifts were valued for gift tax purposes at 
approximately $7.5 million per gift.40  The IRS contested the value, alleging it was 
approximately $12 million per block.41  Sales of Winn-Dixie stock by the decedent, 
the holding company, and the trust were restricted under Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 144.42  The issues in the case were the amount of any discounts for 
the minority positions of the blocks, their lack of marketability, and the sizable 
capital gains tax residing in the holding company if the Winn-Dixie stock, in 
particular, were to be liquidated.43 
 The IRS took the position that no built-in gains tax discount should be 
employed in the case because there was no planned or contemplated liquidation of 
the business.44  Indeed, prior to this case, the Tax Court had held that no such 
                                                 
36 Davis v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 530, 531-32 (1998). 
37 Id.  The Davis case (and the Eisenberg case, discussed below) involved valuation issues in the gift tax 
(not estate tax) context.  Because the federal estate and gift tax systems are “unified,” the valuation 
issues for gift tax purposes are the same as those for estate tax, except for the date on which the 
valuation is made—the date of the gift for gift tax and date of death for the estate tax.  The valuation 
regulations for gift tax mirror those of the estate tax. 
38 Id. at 533. 
39 Id. at 531. 
40 Id. at 534. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 532.  Rule 144 restricts the timing and amount of resales of closely held stock issued pursuant 
to a federal securities law registration exemption.  It is, therefore, an impediment to the marketability 
of such stock, which reduces its fair market value.  See 17 C.F.R. 230.144 (2008). 
43 See Davis, 110 T.C. at 530.  The basis of all the Winn-Dixie stock in the holding company was about 
$338,000, for a gain of approximately $69.6 million as of the valuation date.  The total capital gains tax 
at the time would have been nearly $26 million.  Id. at 533-34. 
44 Id. at 547.  The petitioner had stipulated that there was no planned or contemplated liquidation of 
the business.  Id. 
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discount should be accorded where liquidation was not planned or was speculative.45  
Here, however, the Tax Court changed course.   
 In consideration of the Commissioner’s concession that if liquidation did 
occur or if avoidance of the tax was not accomplished by conversion to an S 
corporation, a substantial tax would be due, the court held that some reduction in 
value was appropriate.46  After parsing through various expert valuations, the court 
held that even though no liquidation was contemplated, hypothetical buyers and 
sellers of the stock would have considered the effect of the tax in determining a 
price.47  The IRS’s position was likely undermined by its own expert, who had 
included some discount for the tax effect as part of the marketability discount.48  The 
court distinguished the cases relied upon by the IRS as either predating the repeal of 
the General Utilities doctrine in 1986 or as cases where the taxpayer sought a 100% 
reduction for the capital gains tax.49  That argument had been rejected in these cases 
because there was no contemplated liquidation.50  In its holding, the Davis court 
granted a discount for some, but less than a full, built-in gains tax effect, but 
incorporated it as part of the discount for a lack of marketability.51  Thus, the Davis 
case marked a breakthrough in the Tax Court’s treatment of the discount.52 
                                                 
45 Id. at 546-47 (citing Estate of Luton v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994); Estate of Bennett v. 
Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. 
Comm’r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piper v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Cruikshank v. 
Comm’r, 9 T.C. 162 (1947); Messing v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 502 (1967); Mandelbaum v. Comm’r, 69 
T.C.M (CCH) 2852 (1995); Estate of Ford v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507 (1993)).  
46 Id. at 547-48.  Conversion to an S Corporation is generally unattractive because assets must be held 
for ten years to avoid taxation on the built-in gains.  See I.R.C. § 1374(a), (d)(7) (2006). 
47 Davis, 110 T.C. at 550. 
48 Id. at 552. 
49 Id. at 551-52.  As previously discussed, no tax would have been due under the General Utilities 
doctrine.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
50 As to the taxpayer’s claim for a full reduction for the amount of the tax, the court stated that since 
no sale of assets was contemplated, the full amount of the tax could not be used as a discount.  Some 
discount, however, was appropriate because complete avoidance of the tax was unlikely and would 
therefore affect the amount a willing buyer would pay.  Davis, 110 T.C. at 552-53. 
51 Id. at 553.  The total tax was approximately $26.7 million.  The court took the net asset value of the 
company, applied a 15% minority discount, and adjusted for a lack of marketability, totaling $29 
million.  Of the $29 million, $9 million was attributable to the built-in gain tax.   
The $9 million was between the amounts calculated by the experts for both sides (one of taxpayer’s 
experts computed a full tax discount, the other taxpayer expert and the IRS’s expert computed a 
partial tax discount).  The Tax Court did not allow any discount for the Rule 144 resale restrictions 
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B.  Eisenberg v. Commissioner  
Two months after the Davis decision, the Second Circuit weighed in on the 
debate in Eisenberg v. Commissioner.53  In Eisenberg, which (like Davis) involved a 
valuation issue with respect to the gift tax, the Second Circuit took a more aggressive 
position on the existence and amount of the tax discount.  The Eisenberg case 
involved an appeal of a grant of summary judgment by the Tax Court, which had 
rejected a taxpayer’s claimed discount for the full amount of built-in gains tax that 
would have been owed had the taxpayer’s wholly-owned corporation liquidated or 
distributed its sole asset.54 
That sole asset of the C-corporation was a commercial building which it 
leased to others.55.  Over three years, the taxpayer gifted stock in the corporation to 
her child and grandchildren.56  The value of the building was determined each year, 
and each year the value was reduced by the full amount of the capital gains tax that 
would have been assessed.57  Eisenberg conceded that there were no plans to sell or 
distribute the building.58  Over the three years, the IRS claimed gift tax deficiencies 
that totaled almost $62,000—all attributable to the claimed tax effect discount.59  The 
sole issue considered by the Second Circuit was the appropriateness of the tax 
discount.60  
In granting the IRS’s motion for summary judgment, the Tax Court had 
relied on the line of cases established before the repeal of the General Utilities 
                                                                                                                                     
because the taxpayer had not satisfied his burden of proof that he was entitled to such a discount, nor 
its amount.  Id. at 544. 
52 The Tax Court stated its new view: “[I]n determining the fair market value on the valuation date of 
each of the blocks of stock at issue, it is necessary to apply a discount or adjustment attributable to . . . 
built-in capital gains tax because that is what a hypothetical willing seller and hypothetical willing 
buyer would have done under the facts and circumstances existing on that date.”  Id. at 552. 
53 Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998). 
54 Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1046 (1997). 
55 Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 51. 
56 Id. at 52. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.   
60Id.  All other issues in the case were stipulated by the parties.  Id. at 52. 
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doctrine, which held that no such discount was permitted.61  These holdings were 
correct under General Utilities and the pre-1986 Code because there was no tax at the 
corporate level on a distribution of appreciated property.  On appeal, the Second 
Circuit considered whether, given the 1986 amendments to the Code, a tax discount 
should be allowed where there was no plan to sell or distribute corporate assets.62  
The taxpayer argued that the hypothetical buyer and seller would undoubtedly reduce 
the corporation’s value by the amount of that tax liability.63  The IRS argued that no 
such tax would be incurred if a buyer bought the company stock and continued 
leasing the building and, given that there were no plans to sell or distribute the 
building, any estimate of the amount would be unduly speculative.64 
The Second Circuit sided with the taxpayer.  First, like the Tax Court in 
Davis, the panel rejected the precedential value of the cases occurring before the 
repeal of General Utilities.65  Second, the court emphasized that in determining fair 
market value based on a hypothetical buyer and seller, it was a hypothetical buyer and 
seller—not actual ones—who should be considered.66  According to the court, it was 
not speculative that a hypothetical buyer would demand a discount for the 
unavoidable capital gains tax.67  Further, that potential tax liability would have a 
depressing effect on the fair market value of the property, and the fair market value 
of the property was what was ultimately being sought.68  The court cited Davis in 
support of its holding.69 
Notably, the Second Circuit left open the issue of the amount of the 
discount.  In a footnote, the court stated: 
                                                 
61 The Tax Court relied on Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 
T.C. 938 (1982), Estate of Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979), and Estate of Cruikshank v. 
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 162 (1947).  Id. at 54.  The Tax Court also cited Gallun v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1316 (1974) as a General Utilities era case supporting the idea that if there were no immediate 
plans to liquidate, a capital gains tax discount was too speculative.  Id. at 57. 
62 Id. at 55-56. 
63 Id. at 56. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 57. 
66 Id. (quoting Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1983). 
67 Id. at 57 (noting that it is indisputable that a hypothetical buyer would demand some discount in 
price because of the inability to avoid the tax liability). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 58. 
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One might conclude from this example that the full amount of the 
capital gains tax should be subtracted from what would otherwise be 
the fair market value of the real estate.  This would not be a correct 
conclusion.  In this case we are only addressing how potential tax 
consequences . . . may affect the fair market value of the shares of 
stock appellant gifted to her relatives in contrast to the fair market 
value of the real estate.70 
The case was then remanded to the Tax Court for a determination of the gift tax 
deficiency.  The Commissioner later acquiesced to the Second Circuit decision.71 
C.  Estate of Welch v. Commissioner 
In Estate of Welch v. Commissioner, an unpublished decision rendered in early 
2000, the Sixth Circuit overturned a Tax Court ruling that denied an estate tax 
valuation discount for potential capital gains tax liability.72  According to the Tax 
Court, the potential for a § 1033 election made the possibility of such a tax too 
speculative to grant a discount.73  On appeal, the IRS conceded that some discount 
was permissible but argued that the taxpayer had failed to prove the appropriate 
amount.74 
First, the Sixth Circuit found that the potential availability of the § 1033 
election would be a consideration of a hypothetical buyer.  The court held, however, 
                                                 
70 Id. at 58 n.15 (emphasis added). 
71 Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998), action on dec., 1999-01 (Jan. 28, 1999).  In its 
Action on Decision, the IRS stated, “We acquiesce in the opinion to the extent that it holds that there 
is no legal prohibition against such a discount.  The applicability of such a discount, as well as the 
amount, will hereafter be treated as factual matters to be determined by competent expert testimony 
based on the circumstances of each case and generally applicable valuation principles.”  Id. 
72 Estate of Welch v. Comm’r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. Mar 1, 2000). 
73 Section 1033 generally provides that no gain is recognized on the involuntary conversion of 
property if the property is converted to a similar or related use or if non-similar property or money is 
received and is used to replace the converted property within two years, except to the extent any 
amount received on conversion exceeds the basis in the property converted, assuming the taxpayer 
makes a timely election to do so.  I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
74 Welch, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315, at *6. 
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that such a consideration did not automatically negate a capital gains tax discount.75  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s holding.76 
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of 
the proper amount of the discount.77  In its remand, the Sixth Circuit stated that 
“petitioners may not be entitled to deduct the full amount of that liability . . . .”78  
Thus, the court left open the issue of whether a discount of the full amount of the 
tax liability was possible. 
D.  Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner 
In Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, a decedent’s estate contained 80,485 shares 
of stock in a holding company. 79  The IRS had assessed a deficiency in the 
decedent’s estate tax based on an alleged undervaluation of the holding company 
stock. 80  The Tax Court agreed, although its valuation differed from that of the 
Service.81  The estate appealed, contending (among other things) that it was entitled 
to a full discount for the capital gains tax liability attributable to certain appreciated 
property residing in the holding company.82  The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax 
Court’s valuation and its method of discounting the capital gains tax liability.83 
The holding company owned 5,405 acres of timber property, which it 
licensed to others in return for a fee.84  These fees accounted for about 80% of the 
holding company’s revenue.85  The property itself was worth $6 million at the time of 
                                                 
75 Id. at *14-15. 
76 Id. at *16 (“The error of the Tax Court was holding, as a matter of law, that the availability of a 
§ 1033 election prevented any discount in the value of the corporation’s stock.”). 
77 Id. at *17. 
78 Id. at *20 (emphasis added). 
79 Estate of Jameson v. Comm’r, 267 F.3d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2001). 
80 See generally Estate of Jameson v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1999), 1999 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 42. 
81 See generally id. 
82 Jameson, 267 F.3d at 371. 
83 Id. at 375. 
84 Id. at 368. 
85 Id. 
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the decedent’s death.86  Another piece of real estate the company owned was worth 
$240,000.87  The company’s bases in the properties were $217,850 and $110,740, 
respectively, which would have resulted in a $5.9 million gain if the property were 
sold or distributed.88  The dispute in this aspect of the case concerned whether and 
to what extent a discount for potential capital gains tax liability should be factored 
into the estate tax valuation.89  The Tax Court allowed no discount for the less 
valuable property because the parties had not presented evidence on the issue.90  It 
permitted a built-in gains tax discount on the timber property but “discounted the 
discount” to reflect a presumption that the timber property would not be liquidated 
immediately but over time.91 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s approach.92  The Fifth Circuit held 
that the Tax Court erred because it had assumed a “strategic” or actual buyer of 
Johnco rather than the required “hypothetical” buyer.93  According to the circuit 
court, a hypothetical buyer would act in the most economically rational way and 
liquidate the property because the return available for continued operation was 
below that which a buyer would demand.94  This computation invalidated the Tax 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 369. 
88 Id. at 368-69. 
89 Id. at 371. 
90 Jameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *59 n.27.  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit also directed the Tax Court to apply a tax discount with respect to this property.  Jameson, 267 
F.3d at 373-74. 
91 Jameson, 77 T.C.M.  (CCH) 1383, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *57.  The Tax Court first said 
that Johnco would realize gains on the sale of its timber pursuant to its election under IRC § 631(a).  
Id.  A § 631(a) election treats the cutting of timber as a deemed sale, and the cut timber acquires the 
value at the time of cutting as the tax basis when it is then sold, which is then ordinary income.  I.R.C. 
§ 631(a) (2006).  Gain was thus unavoidable even if there were no liquidation of the company.  The 
court determined that it would take nine years to fully recognize the built-in gains and utilized a 20% 
discount rate to determine the present value of the capital gains tax.  Jameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 
1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *58-59.  This approach was also utilized by the Tax Court in the 
post-Davis, post-Eisenberg, post-Welch, and post-Jameson decisions of Estate of Dailey v. Commissioner, 82 
T.C.M. (CCH) 90, at 7-8 (2001) (merely accepting taxpayer’s expert’s inclusion of an amount for built-
in gain taxes in the marketability discount without comment), and Borgatello v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 
(RIA) 54013, at 33-36 (2000). 
92 Jameson, 267 F.3d 366 at 371-72. 
93 Id. at 371. 
94 Id. at 372 (“The hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller test substitutes evidence of the actual 
owner’s or purchaser’s intent with the most economically rational analysis of a sale.”).  The projected 
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Court’s valuation, which had been based on continued operation and sale over time.  
Although the Fifth Circuit did not indicate the amount of the capital gains tax 
liability discount, it notably said, “the [Tax Court’s] misplaced emphasis on a 
purchaser engaged in long-run timber production led to its peremptory denial of a 
full discount for the accrued capital gains liability.”95  Later courts would view that 
language as justifying a full discount for the tax liability.96 
E.  Dunn v. Commissioner 
In an extension of its holding in Jameson, the Fifth Circuit in Dunn  v. 
Commissioner granted a taxpayer a full discount for the value of the capital gain tax 
liability attributable to certain appreciated property owned by a closely held 
business.97  The stock of that company formed a part of a decedent’s estate.98 
The closely held business in this case was not a holding company; rather, its 
principal business was the leasing of heavy equipment.99  At the time of the 
decedent’s death, the business’s assets consisted primarily of equipment, some real 
estate, and prepaid expenses and interest.100  The decedent owned about 63% of the 
business’s outstanding stock, but that was not enough under Texas law to force a 
liquidation of the company.101 
The Fifth Circuit faced two issues in this appeal:  (1) the amount of any built-
in capital gains tax liability discount and (2) the weight to assign to different 
measures of value—the earnings-based value for the operating portion of the 
business and the asset-based value for the non-operating portion.  The Tax Court 
had allowed a 5% tax discount and a weighting of 35% to the earnings based value 
and 65% to the asset based value.102  The Fifth Circuit disagreed with both 
                                                                                                                                     
return from continued operation was 14%, while the expected return necessary for the hypothetical 
buyer was 20%.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit called the Tax Court’s assumptions “internally inconsistent” 
and “fatally flawed.”  Id. 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 See discussion infra Part II.E-F. 
97 Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 2002). 
98 Id. at 342. 
99 Id. at 344. 
100 Id. 
101  Id. at 346 (noting that Texas law required at least a 2/3 vote to force a liquidation). 
102 Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, at 17, 33 (2000). 
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conclusions.  Of relevance to this article is the court’s analysis of the tax discount 
issue.103 
The Fifth Circuit found that the amount of potential gain if the equipment 
and real estate were sold and the rate of tax (34%) was undisputed.104  The issue was 
how to account for that tax liability in determining valuation.  The taxpayer argued 
for a full discount for the amount of the potential tax and the Service argued for no 
discount because no sale was contemplated.105  As stated previously, the Tax Court 
had reduced the discount to 5%, finding that a hypothetical buyer would not demand 
a discount unless they contemplated a sale of the assets.106  The meager 5% discount 
represented the unlikelihood of that possibility.107 
The Fifth Circuit described the Tax Court’s analysis in this regard as “simply 
wrong,”108 holding that a hypothetical buyer would demand a full discount for the tax 
liability regardless of future intentions.109  The court stated:  
We hold as a matter of law that the built-in gains tax liability of this 
particular business’s assets must be considered as a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction when calculating the asset-based value of the Corporation, 
just as, conversely, built-in gains tax liability would have no place in 
the calculation of the Corporation’s earnings-based value.110  
The court found that the likelihood of liquidation did not enter the equation of the 
amount of the discount, but rather only the allocation of weights between the 
                                                 
103 The Fifth Circuit revised the weight allocation to be 85% earnings based and 15% asset based.  
Dunn, 301 F.3d at 358-59.  The Tax Court’s determination of value also included discounts for lack of 
marketability (15%) and lack of super-majority control (7.5%).  These discounts were not contested 
on appeal.  Id. at 347. 
104 Id. at 351. 
105 Id. at 351-52.  The IRS argued for no discount because “liquidation was not imminent or even 
likely.”  Id. at 352. 
106 Dunn, 79 T.C.M (CCH) 1337, 32-33. 
107 Id. at 33. 
108 Dunn, 301 F.3d at 352. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 352-53. 
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earnings and asset based valuation methods.111  For purposes of the asset-based 
valuation, the appellate court unanimously held that the assumption of a sale was 
automatic.112  In its conclusion of this aspect of its decision, the court reiterated that 
“determination of the value of [the business] must include a reduction equal to 34% 
of the taxable gain inherent in those assets as of the valuation date.”113  By this time 
this case was decided, the Jelke case was already on the horizon. 
III.  THE JELKE DECISION 
A.  The Facts 
The facts underlying Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner114 are summarized as 
follows:  Commercial Chemical Company (CCC), a closely held C corporation and 
former operating company, had marketable securities as its only assets.115  The 
decedent, Frazier Jelke, died on March 4, 1999, possessing a 6.44% interest in CCC 
through a revocable trust.116  The total net asset value of CCC on the date of Jelke’s 
death was approximately $188 million, and the total capital gain tax liability if the 
securities had been sold on that date would have amounted to just over $51 
million.117  On Jelke’s estate tax return, his interest in CCC was valued at $4.5 million, 
which reflected a reduction in the net asset value for the full amount of the capital 
gain tax liability, a 20% discount for lack of control, and a 35% discount for lack of 
marketability.118  The IRS partially accepted the discounts for lack of control and 
marketability, but issued a deficiency notice asserting that Jelke’s interest was actually 
worth $9.1 million.119  The IRS reduced the full discount for the potential tax liability 
                                                 
111 Id. at 354.  The court stated that the less likely a liquidation, the greater the weight to be given the 
earnings-based value; the greater the likelihood, the greater the weight to be given the asset-based 
calculation.  Id. 
112 Id. at 353 (describing the sale of the assets as a “foregone conclusion”). 
113 Id. at 354. 
114 Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008). 
115 Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005), 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *1. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *8. 
119 Id. at *8-9. 
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to the present value of asset sales conducted over a 16.8 year period.120  The estate 
contested the deficiency in Tax Court in March of 2003. 
B.  The Tax Court Decision 
Although there were issues in the Tax Court regarding the amount of 
discounts for lack of control and marketability, the focus of this article and of the 
Eleventh Circuit concerns the capital gains tax discount.121  The taxpayer argued that 
Dunn,122 was apposite to this case and required a valuation based on liquidation at the 
date of death with a consequent reduction in value for the full amount of the 
projected tax.123  The taxpayer also argued that, due to CCC’s low dividend payout 
rate, a buyer would opt for liquidation.124  The Tax Court disagreed, distinguishing 
from Dunn on the grounds that Dunn was a nonbinding decision from another circuit 
and that Dunn involved a majority interest (whereas Jelke’s interest was only 
6.44%).125  
Concerning valuation determination, the Tax Court agreed with the 
Commissioner’s valuation expert.126  The Tax Court found that based on recent 
history, the asset turnover rate of CCC averaged 5.95% per year, meaning it would 
take 16.8 years for the entire portfolio to turn over.127  Dividing the total potential 
capital gain tax of $51,626,884 by 16.8 resulted in an average capital gain tax of 
$3,226,680 per year.128  Using a discount rate of 13.2%, this average was discounted 
                                                 
120 Id. at *25. 
121 The Tax Court determined the appropriate discounts for control and marketability to be 10% and 
15%, respectively.  Id. at *45, *53.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed those amounts without discussion 
in a footnote.  Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1319 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007). 
122 See discussion supra Part II.E. 
123 Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *28-29. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at *29-30 (holding that “neither the circumstances of this case nor the theory or method used to 
value the minority interest in CCC requires an assumption of complete liquidation on the valuation 
date”).  The Court did not discuss why this factual difference in the cases mattered to the discount 
issue.  Id.  In Dunn, the taxpayer’s lack of super-majority power was only relevant in determining the 
amount of the control discount.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
126 Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *15. 
127 Id. at *25. 
128 Id. at *26. 
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to a present value of approximately $21 million.129  That made Jelke’s share (before 
control and marketability discounts) about $10.8 million.130  Jelke’s expert had 
calculated this amount to be $8.8 million based on a full deduction of the $51 million 
capital gains tax liability.131  After application of the control and marketability 
discounts, the Tax Court held that Jelke’s interest should be valued at $8,254,696 
rather than the estate’s claim of $4,588,155.132  The taxpayer appealed. 
C.  The Eleventh Circuit Decision133 
The Jelke appellate court decision is particularly helpful because the value and 
basis of all the assets of CCC were clear, known, and agreed upon.134  Also, the 
appellate court accepted, without discussion, the lack of control and lack of 
marketability discounts.135  Therefore, the only issue addressed by the Eleventh 
Circuit involved the handling of the discount for the hypothetical capital gains tax.136  
In a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the decision of the Tax Court.137 
After thoroughly reviewing the history of applicable case law beginning with 
General Utilities,138 the majority applied the existing case law to the Jelke facts139.  
Estate tax valuation was described as being based on the “arbitrary assumption that a 
liquidation takes place on the date of death.”140  On this date, a “snap shot” of value 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at *24.  The estate’s expert and the Commissioner’s expert agreed that the date-of-death value 
of the marketable securities was $188,635,833.  Id. at *25.  The estate’s expert then deducted the full 
hypothetical capital gains tax amount of $51,626,884 and multiplied the result by Jelke’s 6.44% 
interest to arrive at $8,823,062 (before control and marketability discounts).  Id. at *24-25. 
132 Id. at *53.  The estate had argued for control and marketability discounts of 25 and 35 percent, 
respectively, but the Tax Court settled at 10 and 15 percent.  Id. at *36. 
133 Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008). 
134 Id. at 1318 n.3.  The assets involved in Jelke were all marketable securities.  Id. 
135 Id. at 1319 n.4. 
136 Id. at 1321. 
137 Citing its recent decision in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner, 428 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005), the 
Jelke appellate court stated that the notion of a hypothetical buyer ignoring the built-in gains tax 
liability “strains credulity and defies any sensible construct of fair market value.”  Id. at 1331. 
138 Id. at 1322-33. 
139 Id. at 1334. 
140 Id. at 1331. 
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is taken.141  Without a great deal of discussion, the Eleventh Circuit majority adopted 
the Dunn approach142 as consistent with the notion of a “snap shot” and presumed 
liquidation as of the date of death.143  The court held that this method avoided the 
uncertainty and speculation of other methods that sought to project sales into the 
future and then discounted them back to the present value.144 
The majority conceded that its approach contained an element of 
arbitrariness.145  However, the court found that any method other than a full 
discount for the capital gains tax lacked certainty and engaged in the kind of 
speculation opposed by the IRS.146  The court held that Dunn “eliminates the crystal 
ball and the coin flip and provides certainty and finality to valuation as best it can, 
already a vague and shadowy undertaking.”147 
The court’s adherence to Dunn resulted in acceptance of the $51 million 
discount argued by the taxpayer.148  The Commissioner filed a petition for certiorari 
with the United States Supreme Court on June 19, 2008.149  It was denied four 
months later.150 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 See discussion supra Part II.E (discussing the Dunn approach). 
143 Id. at 1332. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1331.  However, the court noted that a hypothetical buyer would logically demand the full 
discount because they could otherwise purchase the same mix of investments in the market that CCC 
possessed without incurring the tax risk.  Id. 
146 Id. at 1332 (noting that utilizing the Tax Court’s methodology “could cause the Commissioner to 
revive his ‘too speculative a tax’ contentions made prior to the Estate of Davis in 1998”). 
147 Id. at 1332-33. 
148 Id. at 1333. 
149 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008) (No. 07-1582), 
2008 WL 2472932.  The questions presented by the writ were as follows:  
1. Whether the fair market value of property for purposes of the federal 
estate tax, including selection of an appropriate valuation methodology, is a 
question of fact, reviewed for clear error.   
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, as a matter of law, that 
whenever a company’s fair market value for estate tax purposes is determined 
based on its net asset value, there must be a dollar-for-dollar discount for any built-
in gains tax liability based on the arbitrary assumption that the company was 
liquidated on the valuation date. 
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D.  The Jelke Dissent 
Judge Carnes dissented from the majority holding, arguing that his colleagues 
had opted for the easier but less accurate valuation determination.151  He urged 
upholding the Tax Court decision as one resulting in a value closer to “real.”152  
Judge Carnes found it highly unlikely that a prospective buyer would contemplate 
liquidating a company that had an average annual return of 23% and sizable 
unrealized capital gains.153  Rather, he thought the Tax Court view that CCC would 
continue its turnover rate at about 6% per year was more reasonable and likely.154  
According to the dissent, although a prospective buyer would demand some 
discount for the prospective capital gains, such a buyer could not reasonably expect a 
full discount because no seller would provide it.155 
Further, Judge Carnes argued, if the methodology of the majority was sound, 
it should be applied in other contexts, such as the computation of damage awards in 
tort cases.156  Otherwise, he said—mocking the majority opinion with its own 
words—courts are engaging in “prophesying,” “hunt-and-peck forecasting,” 
“flipping a coin,” or “gazing into a crystal ball.”157  Judge Carnes also accused the 
majority of succumbing to “ignoble ease” and “seductive simplicity” at the cost of 
greater accuracy and realism.158  According to the dissent, the simplicity trumpeted by 
the majority came at the price of arbitrariness.159  Based on its more sophisticated—
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at *I. 
150 Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008). 
151 Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1334 (Carnes, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 1335. 
153 Id. at 1336 (referring to the notion of a prospective buyer liquidating the company’s assets as 
“preposterous”). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 1337. 
157 Id. at 1338. 
158 Id. at 1337. 
159 Id. at 1339.  As previously discussed, the majority conceded as much although they contended that 
the benefits of certainty, simplicity, clarity, consistency, and finality outweighed the apparent 
arbitrariness of their methodology.  Id. at 1333 (majority opinion). 
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and in Carnes’s view, more rational—approach, the dissent argued that the decision 
of the Tax Court should have been affirmed.160 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Code and Regulations indicate that valuation of assets for estate tax 
purposes should be made at the time of death (unless alternate valuation is elected)161 
and that the fair market value of closely held stock should be based on what a 
hypothetical buyer and seller would agree upon as a price.162  This mandate creates 
the issue that is the subject of this article.  While it is quite sensible that the estate tax 
value is determined as of the date of death (or gift tax value be determined as of the 
date of the gift) and that the value be a “fair market value,” it is less clear, but 
certainly defensible, that fair market value should be derived from a “hypothetical” 
buyer and seller.  Several courts have distinguished the hypothetical buyer and seller 
from “actual” or “strategic” ones, and that distinction has led to different 
outcomes.163  Furthermore, the Regulations do not specifically define how a 
hypothetical buyer or seller behaves.  The Regulations do say that both should be 
considered knowledgeable with respect to the transaction involved, and the 
transaction is to be considered voluntary.164  That is the extent of the guidance 
provided by the Regulations. 
                                                 
160 Id. at 1340 (Carnes, J., dissenting). 
161 I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
162 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). 
163 Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1331 (“We are dealing with hypothetical, not strategic, willing buyers and willing 
sellers.”); Jameson v. Comm’r, 267 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The hypothetical willing 
buyer/willing seller test substitutes evidence of the actual owner’s or purchaser’s intent with the most 
economically rational analysis of the sale.”); Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2nd Cir. 1998); 
Estate of Bright v. Comm’r, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1984); Estate of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79 
T.C. 938, 956 (1982) (“[T]he case law and regulations require a truly hypothetical willing seller and 
willing buyer.  We must assume these hypothetical parties exist even though the reality of the situation 
may be that the stock will most probably be sold to a particular party or type of person.”); LeFrak v. 
Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1297 (1993), 1993 WL 470956, at *3 (“The standard is an objective test 
using hypothetical buyers and sellers in the marketplace, and is not a personalized one which 
envisions a particular buyer and seller.”). 
164 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (“[N]either being under any compulsion to buy or 
to sell and both having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (as 
amended in 1992) (containing the same language). 
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Determining the value of closely-held stock is, in the best of circumstances, 
an elusive task for any court.165  When courts deviate from a valuation methodology 
that assumes a date-of-death liquidation and a fully discountable capital gains tax, 
they are heading into speculative territory.  If a court presumes sales over time as the 
Tax Court did in Jelke, a number of variables become speculative, such as a turnover 
rate that is the same as the average turnover over the preceding “X” number of 
years, a turnover rate that is constant over a multi-year period despite the likely ups 
and downs of the market, a constant capital gains tax rate, future asset values which 
may be significantly higher or lower than actual, a presumed rate of return, a 
constant mix of investments over a multi-year period, and a continued corporate 
existence until the turnover reaches 100%.   
Assumptions concerning these variables are more subjective and prone to 
error than a methodology that simply assumes liquidation at the date of death and 
computes and discounts for the amount of tax on any gains that would result.  The 
latter methodology is clear and certain but admittedly rather arbitrary.  Furthermore, 
the virtues of certainty, clarity, consistency, simplicity, and finality should not be 
denigrated.  If there was a clearly more accurate and less arbitrary valuation 
methodology that required greater complexity and sophistication, of course that 
methodology should triumph in the pursuit of that discernable accuracy.  That, 
however, is not the case.   
The Jelke Tax Court and dissenting Court of Appeals Judge Carnes believed 
that the greater complexity and sophistication they advocated resulted in a more 
accurate valuation.  That is a mistaken belief:  It may be more accurate, but it also 
may not.166  Absent the crystal ball Judge Carnes mocked or the revelations of time, 
no one can know which valuation (the Tax Court’s or the Eleventh Circuit’s) is more 
accurate.  Either or both may be wildly or only slightly inaccurate.  Since the 
                                                 
165 See Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations:  Pursuing the Phantom 
of Objectivity into the New Millennium, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (2001). 
166 As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Dunn (requiring a dollar-for-dollar reduction for the built-in capital 
gains tax):   
[V]aluing businesses, particularly closely held corporations, is not pure science 
replete with precise formulae and susceptible of mathematical calculation but 
instead depends largely on subjective opinions . . . [and] necessarily contain some 
vagaries, ambiguities, inexactitudes, caveats, and qualifications . . . the methodology 
we employ today may be viewed by some . . . as unsophisticated, dogmatic, overly 
simplistic, or just plain wrong . . . .  In this regard, we observe that the end of the 
methodology spectrum opposite oversimplification lies over-engineering.  
Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339, 358 n.36 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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Regulations require the use of hypothetical buyers and sellers and since any method 
utilized may significantly under- or over-value closely held stock, it seems reasonable 
and prudent to presume liquidation as of the date of death, compute the capital gains 
tax at known current rates, and deduct the full amount of the tax from the 
liquidation amount.  From there, discounts for lack of control and lack of 
marketability can be employed (two other decidedly imprecise measures).167  As 
Revenue Ruling 59-60 indicated, the determination of the value of a closely held 
business is more art than science, and we must tolerate the reality that art is not 
subject to precise measurement.168  It is indeed unfortunate that the Supreme Court 
                                                 
167The Internal Revenue Service defines a marketability discount as “[a]n amount or percentage 
deducted from an equity interest to reflect a lack of marketability” and a minority discount as “[t]he 
reduction, from the pro rata share of the value of the entire business, to reflect the absence of power 
or control.”  Glossary, IRS Valuation Guide for Income, Estate and Gift Taxes:  Valuation Training 
for Appeals Officers (1997).  The IRS Valuation Guide also says, “. . . Courts have allowed discounts 
ranging from 10 percent to 65 percent for marketability and minority interest.”  Id. at 99.  See also 
Leacock, supra note 165, at 196-200. 
168 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (stating that “valuation is not an exact science”).  Regarding 
securities, the Ruling states:  “Valuation of securities is, in essence, a prophecy as to the future and 
must be based on facts available at the required date of appraisal.”  Id. at § 3.03.  Allowing a full 
discount for the tax on built-in gains would also arguably be more consistent with the Ruling’s 
injunction to be “based on facts available at the required date” rather than other methodologies which 
hypothesize discount rates and assume constants that, in fact, will change over time.  Id.  The 
Eleventh Circuit stated in Jelke:   
Cases prior to the Estate of Dunn, prophesying as to when the assets will be 
sold and reducing the tax liability to present value, depending upon the length of 
time discerned by the court over which these taxes shall be paid, require a crystal ball.  
The longer the time, the lower the discount.  The shorter the time, the higher the 
discount. 
The downside of this approach is that, not only is it fluidly ethereal, it 
requires a type of hunt-and-peck forecasting by the courts.  In reality, this method could 
cause the Commissioner to revive his “too speculative a tax” contentions made 
prior to the Estate of Davis in 1998.  This methodology requires us to either gaze into 
a crystal ball, flip a coin, or, at the very least, split the difference between the present 
value calculation projections of the taxpayers on the one hand, and the present 
value calculation projections of the Commissioner, on the other. 
We think the approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit in the Estate of Dunn 
is the better of the two.  The estate tax owed is calculated based upon a “snap shot 
of valuation” frozen on the date of Jelke’s death, taking into account only those facts 
known on that date.  It is more logical and appropriate to value the shares of CCC 
stock on the date of death based upon an assumption that a liquidation has 
occurred, without resort to present values or prophesies. 
The rationale of the Fifth Circuit in the Estate of Dunn eliminates the crystal 
ball and the coin flip and provides certainty and finality to valuation as best it can, 
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declined to hear the Jelke case because it could have provided a methodology that 
would result in consistency of application and greater uniformity of results in the 
valuation of closely held stock for estate and gift tax purposes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Jelke case provided the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to 
clarify the law concerning the appropriate discount for capital gains taxes in the 
valuation of closely held stock for estate and gift tax purposes.  Jelke was a “clean” 
case in that the overall value of the corporate assets was known and agreed upon by 
all parties.169  Further, there was no dispute about the amount of the discounts for 
lack of control or marketability.170  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly 
held that the full amount of the tax should be used in calculating the discount.171  
The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, have implied (but not definitively held) that 
something less than the full amount is more appropriate.172  Jelke provided a ripe 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the issue, but the Supreme Court 
declined to do so for the time being.  Cases concerning this topic will continue to 
percolate in the lower courts because the issue is significant and the amounts in 
controversy are often in the millions of dollars.  The sooner the Supreme Court acts, 
the sooner this aspect of the valuation conundrum can be settled, and taxpayers and 
the Service can have clarity with regard to at least one component of this “vague and 
shadowy undertaking.”173 
 
                                                                                                                                     
already a vague and shadowy undertaking.  It is a welcome road map for those in 
the judiciary, not formally trained in the art of valuation. 
Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1332-33 (emphasis added). 
169 Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1318 n.3. 
170 Id. at 1319 n.4. 
171 Id. at 1317; Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002). 
172 Estate of Welch v. Comm’r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2000); 
Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998). 
173 Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1333. 
